Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium
Volume 2

Article 4

1-1-1997

The Source of International Legal Personality in
The Twenty First Century
James E. Hickey Jr.
Hofstra Law School, james.e.hickey@hofstra.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlps
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Hickey, James E. Jr. (1997) "The Source of International Legal Personality in The Twenty First Century," Hofstra Law & Policy
Symposium: Vol. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlps/vol2/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law &
Policy Symposium by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

The Source of International Legal Personality in the
21st Century
by
James E. Hickey, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION.

This essay introduces Volume 2 of the Hofstra Law and Policy
Symposium by commenting on the evolution of international legal
personality under international law and on some approaches that seem to
be emerging regarding the source of international legal personality in the
next century. In a broad sense international legal personality refers to the
rights and duties held by entities under international law. This volume
focuses on the legal personality of entities other than states.' A fundamental question regarding international legal personality is: From what
international law source do non state entities hold substantive rights and
duties, including the legal capacity to assert those rights and duties in
international and domestic fora?
The source of international legal personality in international relations
in the twenty first century goes to the heart of international governance
in at least two respects. First, it affects how local, regional and global
communities of humans will be governed. Second, it shapes the manner
in which that governance, whatever form it takes, will account to
populations for its actions or failures to act.
An underlying issue raised by any inquiry into source is whether the
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assertion of international political identity by a non state entity should
establish, without more, international legal personality as a matter of
international law? If entities and actors other than states are able to
successfully assert independent international legal personality in their
own right in the international legal system, the present system of state
accountability to the world's population for the creation of international
law rights and duties will be diluted and the source of international legal
personality will shift away from states.
In the last 50 years, new approaches to the source of international
legal personality have begun to emerge in response to the dramatic
changes in the economic, political, cultural and social world order. Those
changes are reflected in at least six global developments, most of which
have yet to be completed.
First, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's
signaled the end of the political and military "empire" system of world
governance - a process that began in earnest at the close of World War
II with the movements to replace colonies with independent states.
Second, the early 1990's also signaled the end of the Cold War and an
accelerating movement toward global economic integration and political
cooperation on regional and global fronts. Third, states increasingly have
moved to embrace both democratic forms of government and privatized
free market economies. Fourth, the computerized information age has
arrived, which has made news and data of every kind and description
available instantaneously to an increasing portion of the world's
population. Fifth, the global problems needing global responses have
increased dramatically in the last half decade in such areas as crime,
energy, the environment, finance, food, human rights, intellectual
property, natural resources, and trade, all of which have involved varying
degrees of international effort to resolve. Sixth, the number of entities,
state and non state, that have become involved in those global issues has
multiplied exponentially and now collectively number in the thousands.2
If, as is likely, the trend of these developments continues, the source
of international legal personality in the 21st century may be fundamental-

2. The number of states that are members of the United Nations has grown from 51 founding
members in 1945 to 185 in 1995. XXXII U.N.Monthly Chron. no.2, June, 1995, Backcover. Non

state entities - international organizations (regional and global), specialized agencies of the United
Nations, corporations (national and multinational), nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), and
humans (individually and collectively). -involved in global issues have also increased dramatically
in number and variety. For a discussion of the role of NGOs in international decision making see,
Peter J. Spiro, New Global Communities:Nongovernmental Organizationsin InternationalDecisionMaking Institutions,THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY 45 (Winter 1995).
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ly different than it has been in the past.
The primary non state entities that are affected by the presence or
absence of international legal personality under international law are
international organizations, United Nations specialized agencies, regional
organizations, human beings, corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and subnational governments.
This essay briefly lays out the legal historical evolution for the
emerging approaches to the sources of international legal personality for
non state entities, broadly classifies the approaches to the source of
international legal personality that seem to be emerging, and concludes
that the source of international legal personality for non state entities in
the twenty first century ought to continue to be derived from states
provided states generally both adhere to concepts of popular sovereignty
and respond adequately to the changing realities of global integration.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PERSONALITY.

From the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 until the second half of this
century, the source of international legal personality was, for the most
part, relatively easy to determine. States were subjects of international
law with international legal personality and other entities were not, unless
either states specifically conferred personality on them (through some
discernable legal principle, a municipal law statute, or an international
law instrument such as a treaty), or states by acquiescence accepted their
personality.3
The evolution of international legal personality for non state entities
has focused principally on international organizations, specialized
agencies, regional organizations, and human beings.
1.

Global InternationalOrganizations.

International legal personality for non state entities began with the
evolution of the international organization out of multilateral diplomacy.4
The first form of structured, multi-state cooperation was the practice of
states to hold ad hoc multi-state conferences in situations where bilateral

3. See generally, IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (4th ed.
1990); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Clarendon Press

1979).
4. See generally, DEREK W. BOwE'r, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1982).

HOFSTRA LAW &POLICY SYMPOSIUM

[Vol. 2:1

diplomacy proved inadequate. For example, the Peace of Westphalia
itself was the product of such an international conference as was the
Congress of Vienna in 1815.
A significant limitation of ad hoe conferences, especially the
nineteenth-century conferences, was a fastidious adherence to the
principle of the sovereign equality of states. This tended to limit
participation only to states that reached decisions unanimously on the
basis of complete equality in voting. Unanimity and equal voting were
necessary because majority voting or weighted votes would allow one
group of states to assert their will over others contrary to strict notions
of sovereign equality. These types of temporary conferences, while
certainly useful, are not particularly well suited to deal comprehensively,
and in a timely manner, with long term, continuing problems of
substantial concern to the international community.
More permanent and enduring international structures may need to
be established. For example, recent attempts to deal with land mines and
global warming have not relied on ad hoc international conferences
alone, but have combined conferences with proposals for a subsequent
treaty regime to address the long term issues.
Parallel to the system of ad hoc conferences, administrative public
international unions developed to address specific human needs. These
public international unions were, more or less, continuing associations of
states organized through a permanent administrative or deliberative organ
of some kind to carry out the purposes of the union. They were created
by states through multilateral treaties. The public unions were primarily
functional, nonpolitical, entities and included the international river
commissions, the postal, telegraphic and railway unions, and the metric,
copyright and sugar unions. Interestingly, some of these state-created
unions, like the Metric Union and the International Labor Organization
(ILO), were established to augment, replace or institutionalize private
unions, which had been formed by private individuals or corporations
located in more than one state to address their private international
interests.5
The significance of the public administrative unions for purposes of
the source of international legal personality is threefold. First, the legal
personality of the public unions, to the extent it existed, emanated from
states. Second, the relinquishment of sovereignty by states that this
entailed was at times extraordinary. For example, the International Sugar

5. Id. at 4-6.
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Union founded in 1902 "had a permanent commission which, by majority
vote, could order a change in municipal legislation" of participating
states.' Third, the public unions demonstrated an ability of states
generally to adapt to international needs and to meaningfully respond to
the concerns originally raised by private nongovernmental international
actors about specific pressing problems of international scope.
During the twentieth century, states collectively also began to
address international political problems in the aftermath of the two world
wars through permanent international organizations - first, with the
founding of the League of Nations and, later the United Nations. The
source and extent of the international legal personality of the League, and
especially the U.N. Organization, ultimately was expressed in their
founding charters created by the member states - The Covenant of the
League of Nations and the United Nations Charter.
Here, authority was not vested collectively in the individual
members (like unincorporated associations or partnerships at municipal
law) but rather in the international organization as a distinct legal
personality, although this need not have been the case should the member
states have so provided.7 This approach to international organizations
means that states impliedly conferred on the organization the international legal personality needed to carry out the functions assigned to it
consistent with the purposes and principles specified in the legal
instrument creating it. As the ICJ put it in its advisory opinion in the
Reparations Case regarding the capacity of the U.N. Organization to
bring an international claim for injury to its personnel:
In the opinion of the Court, the [U.N.] Organization
was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact
exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can
only be explained on the basis of the possession of a
large measure of international personality and the
capacity to operate upon an international plane. It is at
present the supreme type of international organization,
and it could not carry out the intentions of its founders
if it was devoid of international personality. It must be
acknowledged that its Members [as expressed in the
U.N. Charter as a whole], by entrusting certain functions to it with the attendant duties and responsibilities,

6. Id. at 8.
7. See Exchange of Greek and Turkish Population Case, PCUI, Series B No.10; Reparation
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the U.N., [1949] I.CJ. Rep. 174. (Reparations Case).
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have clothed it with the competence required to enable
those functions to be effectively discharged. Accordingly, the Court has come to the conclusion
that the
8
Organization is an international person.
This implied powers approach to international legal personality has
now expanded beyond that directly and absolutely necessary to the
functioning of an international organization to include indirect powers
"relating to the purposes and functions specified in the constitution" of
the organization.9
An unresolved question about the international legal personality of
international organizations like the U.N. is whether its personality, once
established, contains any inherent legal capacity to act apart from that
explicitly conferred or implied in the founding instruments. If not, then
acts of international organizations not expressly or impliedly contained
in the controlling legal instruments of the organization may be ultra
vires." If an inherent legal capacity does exist, then the international
organization might have to be viewed "as a dynamic institution, evolving
to meet changing needs and circumstances and, as time goes by,
becoming further and further removed from its treaty base". 1' In either
event, the ultimate power over international organizations remains with
states, if, for no other reason, than that states may always choose to
dissolve an international organization that they have created. Of course,
the more removed that the exercise of international legal personality by
an international organization is from its constitutional roots the more
difficult becomes any decision of states to dissolve such an organization.
2. Specialized Agencies.
Certain global international organizations have evolved with limited
functional competence and with a direct and special relationship with the
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of
the United Nations. These intergovernmental organizations are "specialized agencies", which are "brought into relationship with the United
Nations" and which have "wide international responsibilities" in
"economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related fields." 12

8. Reparations Case, supra note 7 at 178.
9. Bowett, supra note 3 at 338.

10. See Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations [1962] I.C.L Rep. 163.
11. See Bowett, supra note 3 at 338.
12. Articles 57 and 63 of the U.N. Charter.
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The "wide international responsibility" characteristic generally precludes
regional entities from specialized agency status. 3
The specialized agencies include the Food and Agricultural
Organization(FAO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT),
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development(LBRD), the
International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO), the International
Development Association(IDA), the International Finance Corporation(IFC), the International Fund for Agricultural Development(IFAD),
the International Labor Organization(ILO), the International Monetary
Fund(IMF), the International Maritime Organization(IMO), the International Telecommunications Union(ITU), the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency(MIGA), the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization(UNESCO), the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization(UNIDO), the Universal Postal Union(UPU),
the World Health Organization(WHO), the World Intellectual Property
Organization(WIPO), and the World Meteorological Organization(WMO).14

ECOSOC carries out the U.N.'s relationships with specialized
agencies, coordinates the tasks of the specialized agencies, and makes
recommendations to specialized agencies under intergovernmental
agreements approved by the U.N. General Assembly. The intergovernmental agreements approved by the General Assembly confer varying

degrees of autonomy upon the specialized agencies. The agreements also
generally address the membership of states, reciprocity and cooperation
among specialized agencies, the role of the U.N. Organization, budget
and finance matters, and the non-voting participation by non state entities
(typically by conferring on them "associate membership" in the agency).
As with international organizations, the specialized agencies derive
their international legal personality and autonomy to act from specific
legal instruments (i.e. the U.N. Charter and the intergovernmental
agreements approved by the General Assembly) and from the state
governments that are party to the instruments creating specialized
agencies. Most specialized agencies, under the U.N. Charter and their
respective intergovernmental agreements, have locus standi to seek
Justice on "legal questions
advisory opinions of the International Court of
16
activities".
their
of
scope
the
within
arising
13. See discussion of regional organizations below.
14. XXXII UN Monthly Chron.(No. 2), June 1995, Backcover.
15. Article 63 of the U.N. Charter.
16. Article 96 (2) of the U.N. Charter.
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Special mention should be made of the voting and participation
procedure that the ILO has had for nongovernmental employers and
employees because it "illustrates very forcibly the kind of problems
which may be encountered once interests are represented, other than State
interests, side by side with States.""7 Historically, voting rights in the
ILO were conferred on three distinct groups - States, employers and
employees - on the assumption that each group was independent from
the others. That assumption of independence, of course, did not
necessarily apply to socialist or communist states in which states may be
the employer and in which the employees work for the state. The voting
rights in those circumstances inherently were skewed and tipped in favor
of the socialist and communist states because the employer group
effectively became an additional voting delegate of those states in the
General Conference of the 110.
The "unhappy history" of the ILO's attempts to accommodate voting
representation for both state and non state interests indicates that great
caution needs to be exercised in altering the future representative
character not only of specialized agencies but of international and
regional organizations as well."8 That history also generally underscores
the "devil-in-the-details" of conferring, as a matter of international law
right, full, unfettered, international legal personality, on a par with states,
upon such non state entities as private corporations, special interest
9
nongovernmental organizations, and subnational governmental units.'
3. Regional InternationalOrganizations.
Regional international organizations are organizations created by
states that share a common, geographic or policy, bond. Regional
international organizations have been in existence since the beginning of
this century.20 Originally, they were created for security reasons but
more recently they have embraced political and economic purposes as
well.
Regional international organizations inielude the Arab League, the

17. Bowett, supra note 3 at 123.
18. Id.
19. See discussion of the factual realist approach below.
20. For example, Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations recognized the

legitimacy of regional groupings of states for security reasons:
Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity on intemational engagements such as treaties of arbitrations or regional undertakings like the Monroe
Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace.
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Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the British Commonwealth, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Council
of Europe, the European Commission (EC), the European Union (EU),
The South American Common Market (MERCOSUR), the North
American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the
Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the defunct South East Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Warsaw Pact.
Generally, the same international legal personality considerations
that apply to global international organizations apply also to regional
organizations. That is, the international legal personality of these varied
regional organizations is, like international organizations, grounded in the
international legal instruments agreed to by the states that create them
and in the implied powers exercised and functions carried out by those
organizations. 21
There is a potential tension between regional organizations and
global international organizations. That tension may exist where regional
organizations stress special interests peculiar to a region at the expense
of efforts to achieve global or universal cooperation through the United
Nations or other international bodies. For example, regional "positions"
are developing in the areas of human rights, international trade and the
environment which may be viewed, in certain respects, as being at odds
with the efforts of global international organizations to deal with these
subjects. A settled approach to the source of international legal personality for global and regional international organizations might help to
resolve some of those tensions in the future.
4. Human Beings.
Historically, individuals and groups of individuals, for the most part,
were treated as objects of international law without international legal

21. For example, the European Court of Justice has opined that the power of the European

Community to bind the Community to international commitments with third states "flows by
implication from the provisions of the Treaty [of Rome] creating the internal power and in so far

as the participation of the Community in the international agreement is... necessary for the
attainment of one of the objectives of the Community." (emphasis added). Opinion 1176, [1977]
E.C.R. 741 at 755.
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personality.' That is, international law did not acknowledge that human
beings as such had international law rights. International law rights
existed in states (the subjects of international law) in their relations with
other states. Humans, individually and collectively, generally had no
direct international legal personality in the absence of some cognizable
and specific legal capacity accepted by the general practice of states or
established by treaty.
The evolution of generic international legal personality for humans,
more or less, has divided into three substantive stages that have been
termed the human rights "generations."' 3 The first generation of human
24
rights is least controversial and comprises civil and political rights.
The second generation of human rights is comprised of economic, social
and cultural rights. 25 The third, and most controversial, generation of
human rights addresses collective or solidarity rights which include,
among others, claims of human rights to develop, to peace, and to a
healthy and safe environment.
With certain important and limited exceptions, the international legal
personality of humans remained, until after World War II, derivative and
merely a vehicle for states to assert claims among themselves.2 6 Individual or collective "rights" of human beings under international law only
existed indirectly and to the extent that states chose to take up the cause
of their own nationals and assert them against another state. 27 The
notion here was that any injury to humans to be protectable under
international law had to constitute an injury to the state of which the
humans were nationals.2 8 State sovereignty generally precluded states
from taking up the causes or claims of the nationals of other states on the
theory that no other state's legal interest was involved when a state

22. To a much lesser extent this remains true even today.
23. See Richard B. Lillich and Hurst Hannum, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (3d ed.) 1995
at 194-201.

24. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 1966, entered into
force 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
25. See International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 1966,
entered into force 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
26. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction), P.C.IJ., Ser.A, No.2, p.6 (1924).
27. Id. at 12. ('Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of its subjects before an international tribunal in the eyes of the latter the State is the sole claimant.").

28. See The Nottebohm Case (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 ICJ 4, - ('[Niationality is a
legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests

and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.")
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mistreated its own nationals.29 On the same theory, stateless persons
were without even derivative international legal personality because no
state was entitled (i.e. had jurisdiction) to take up their cause.
To the extent international legal personality for humans existed, it
tended to apply only selectively to human beings in specific roles. That
is, human beings were "protectable" if states having the necessary legal
interest in those human beings chose to take up their protection and if
human beings were, for example, aliens, prisoners of war, civilians in
war time, populations in mandate or trust territories, or diplomatic agents.
Similarly, human beings were "prosecutable" by states if human beings
were, for example, high seas pirates or slave traders.
A more prominent status for humans in their own right began to
evolve after World War II when states, through Articles 55 and 56 of the
U.N. Charter, "pledged" "to take joint and separate action in co-operation
with the [U.N.] Organization" to achieve "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."3' Over the past 50
years, since the adoption of the U.N. Charter, states have gradually taken
actions in a large number of international treaties and instruments both
to acknowledge the existence of a considerable variety of specific human
rights for all humans and to accept in principle, and increasingly in
practice, certain rights and duties with regard to all humans. 3
III. APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY
IN THE 21ST CENTURY.
If the universe of international legal personalities were limited to
states, international organizations (global and regional), U.N. specialized

29. An exception to this rule that a state had exclusive jurisdiction over its nationals inside its
territory which could not be interfered with by other states was the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention. Humanitarian intervention recognized that states could use force against another state
if that other state treated its nationals in a way that shocked the conscience of civilized states.
Historically, the doctrine, more often than not, was wrongly invoked to justify invasion by states
and did not constitute very substantial evidence of state recognition of a general international legal
personality for humans.
30. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 11553 (1969).
31. The foundational instruments conferring and accepting the international legal personality
of humans regarding human rights are contained in the "international bill of human rights" which
is comprised primarily of the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocols, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
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agencies, and human beings (individually and collectively), the source of
international legal personality would not appear to impose especially
difficult jurisprudential issues in the 21st Century, apart from the
relatively limited problem of the extent of implied powers for
international organizations and specialized agencies of the UN. In each
case, there must exist some constitutive legal instrument, some legal
principle, or some general practice of states accepted as law that may be
examined to determine the source of a non state entity's legal rights and
duties, its legal capacity, or its legal interest.
In recent decades, however, a plethora of new political identities
such as multinational corporations, subnational governments and nongovernmental organizations - have emerged as new actors in international
relations. Unresolved with these new international political identities is
the source, if any, of their international legal personality. That lack of
resolution poses several fundamental questions for international law in
the 21st Century including the following: Must these new international
political identities, as non state entities have had to do in the past,
establish their international legal personality by pointing to some public
international law source (treaty, general practice of states accepted as
law, or general principle of law)?; May they claim international legal
personality, in their own right, apart from state-created international law?;
If so, to what extent may they exercise that international legal personality
by claiming rights to participate in international conferences, assemblies
of international organizations and by acquiring locus standi in international courts and tribunals?; May they participate directly (i.e. by voting
or by litigating), as a matter of right, in the formation of future intemational law?
The suggested answers to such questions, as could be expected, vary
widely and reflect a combination of agendas, values, perceptions, and
philosophies on world governance and accountability.
There seem to be at least three broad classifications emerging
regarding the source of international legal personality for these new
political identities: 1. the legal traditionalist approach; 2. the factual
realist approach; and 3. the dynamic state approach.
1. The legal traditionalistapproach.
The legal traditionalists tend to approach international legal
personality for new, international, non state, political, identities from the
position that sovereign states have primacy over all other entities and
actors. That primacy places full international legal personality, in the first

19971

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY

instance, in states in the sense that states are the ultimate source for
rights, duties, privileges and immunities under traditional international
law. Legal traditionalists would require new international political
identities to establish that they directly or impliedly derive claimed
international legal personality in some manner from states in the same
way that existing non state legal personalities, like international
organizations do. 32Here, the international legal personality of non states
entities must be discernibly transferred from states to the nonstate entity
through some legal instrument, general principle of law, or rule of
customary international law (the general practice of states accepted as
law). Without that transfer, non state entities should not be taken to have
either international legal personality or the consequent legal standing or
legal capacity to assert international law rights and duties directly in
international law fora.
An underlying rationale for the legal traditionalist approach to the
source of international legal personality is a powerful one: States under
the international legal system are "the repositories of legitimated
authority over peoples and territories" and appropriately must be the
ultimate legally traceable source for the international legal personality for
all non state entities.3 3 Legal traditionalist stress that an inherent
definitional requirement for statehood, absent in all other non state
entities, is a stable population living in a defined territory. As such, all
international law rights and obligations properly flow from states.
Otherwise, state populations could be bound by international law formed
and applied without their consent expressed through their state governments contrary to notions of law based on a source of representative
government. The traditional international law approach to international
legal personality finds support in the movement of states away from
absolute sovereignty to popular sovereignty which accepts that the
authority of state government rests with its population and is accountable

32. The International Court of Justice opined that the U.N. Organization had international legal
personality, at least where the source of U.N. legal personality may be fairly implied from the U.N.
Charter, where the functioning of the United Nations requires that it be treated as a legal personality,
and where subject matter is involved over which states have recognized U.N. competence
(Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the U.N., 1949 IC.J. Rep. 174, 182):
Under international law the Organization must be deemed to have those powers, which,
though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary
implication as being essential to the perfonnance of its duties.
33.

(1964).

WOLFGANG G. FREIDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 213
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to its population for its governance acts or failures to act.34 In this way,
at least theoretically, the seat of sovereignty and formal international law
making remains ultimately with the populations of defined geographic
territories.
For the most part, legal traditionalists would treat non state entities
at the international level no differently than non state entities are treated
under municipal law, at least as to the legal source of their rights and
duties. That is, citizens, groups, corporations, and subnational governments to successfully claim legal personality under municipal law must
be able to ground claimed rights and duties flowing from that personality
to some accepted municipal law principle, statute, or regulation.
Similarly, the legal traditionalist approach would firmly tether international legal personality for new international political identities to the
state in the international legal system more or less as it has been in the
past.
2.

The FactualRealist Approach.

The factual realists generally assert, as a matter of fact, that the state
is irretrievably in decline and that new non state entities are increasing
in number and influence in international relations. Those facts, in turn,
require complementary and fundamental changes in the legal source of
international legal personality under international law, especially if the
trend of those facts continues into the 21st Century.
Under the factual realist scenario, there would arise in the place of
states, presumably, either of two international structures. The first
possible structure would be some sort of monistic international governmental entity like a unitary global super state. The second, alternative,
structure would be a non-territorially based more fluid global system in
which states, although they may continue to exist, are dominated by a
world wide web of international organizations, public and private interest
groups, corporations, and subnational governments operating through
interconnected economic, financial, and political relationships.
As to the decline of the state, factual realists point to global
integration on all fronts, which they posit is reducing the nature and
relevance of the state, at least as the ultimate source of international legal
personality for non state entities. In this new world order, the primacy of
states is increasingly anachronistic because the factual predicate for the

34. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOvERNMENT 87 (ed. J.W. Cough) (1956).
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continued dominance of territorially-based political economies epitomized
by the state is eroding. Factual realists point to the increasing movement
and mobility of humans, the growing acceptance of dual or multiple
nationalities for humans," and the emergence of non-territorial international markets (underscored by cyberspace and the internet). As a result
of such facts, states, viewed from an international perspective, are
becoming increasingly removed and separate from their populations on
a growing number of fronts. Populations, in turn, are relying increasingly upon a growing number of non state entities to represent and pursue
an expanding variety of international interests. Factual realists also assert
that the passive-reactive response of states to new international problems
makes their position as the legal source of international legal personality
for non state entities out of date. As a result of this new factual reality,
states in the future should no longer be the sole international law source
of the international legal personality of non state entities.
As to the rise of non state entities, factual realists point to the
explosion in the total number of international and regional organizations,
NGOs, corporations (national and multinational), subnational governments, joint ventures, and other international political identities that, in
fact, are exercising growing influence in reshaping international law to
respond to changes in international society. As a result, non state entities,
in addition to relying on states for their international legal personality
and locus standi, ultimately ought to be able to establish for themselves
their international legal personality and capacity. That is, once a non state
entity factually establishes an ability to influence and shape the content
and application of international law, it should have international legal
personality with, or without, the permission of states. In these factual
circumstances, the legal traditionalist approach comes under increasing
pressure. Factual circumstances alone may not justify directly bypassing
the framework of nation states to create a wholly new concept of
international legal personality. However, changes in fundamental facts
need to be accommodated, in some manner, by international law.
Otherwise, there is a risk that international law will have a greatly
diminished role in the governance of modern international society that is
limited to traditional state-to-state relations.

35. For a comprehensive examination of dual nationality, see Peter J. Spiro, Dual
Nationality And The Meaning Of Citizenship, 46 EMoRY L.J. 1411 (1997).
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The dynamic state approach.

The dynamic state approach takes, more or less, a middle position
between the legal traditionalist and the factual realist approaches on the
source of international legal personality for new non state international
political identities. The dynamic state approach generally views that both
legal traditionalists and factual realists assume a static, rigid body of
international law: the legal traditionalists tend to preserve it; the factual
realists tend to ignore it. The dynamic state approach posits a more fluid
and accommodating relationship between international law and international facts. It suggests that an increasingly vibrant interaction exists
among municipal and international law, states and other international
players, and the source of international legal personality.
Under this approach to international legal personality, the state is
viewed as a dynamic and resilient entity that is increasingly responsive
to changes in international facts.36 Far from being in decline, the
governance entity of choice, of course, among the populations of the
world is the state.37 For example, after the demise of the Soviet Union,
the political aspirations of the former Soviet Union populations led to the
establishment of a number of new independent states as the most
desirable form of governance. In the 1990's alone 29 new states became
members of the United Nations. 8
The dynamic state approach to the source of international legal
personality takes the view that, over the long term, states have responded
satisfactorily to changes in international facts in several respects. First,
states, in response to changes in political philosophy, have moved away
from notions of absolute state sovereignty to acceptance of popular
sovereignty in which state governments have direct accountability to their
populations. Second, states have directly and impliedly conferred on a
growing number of international and regional organizations and agencies
the competence necessary to address an impressive array of international
problems including peace-keeping, health, food, global finances, global
and regional environments, human rights, and energy. Third, for at least
a half century, states have made explicit provision, in a variety of
settings, for the participation of new international political identities in

36. See, Mark L. Movsesian, The Persistent Nation State and The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 18 CARDoZo L. REv. 1083 (1996).
37. Supra, note 2.
38. Id.
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international law fora.39
State dynamists also point to the substantial changes made by states
to international law that demonstrate a capacity to adapt to changing
international facts on many fronts. For example, in the international law
on the environment states have long embraced aspects of strict state
responsibility for the extraterritorial effects of pollution.40 And states are
in the process now of embracing the precautionary principle under which
states assume obligations to prevent certainty emissions and discharges
even in the absence of scientific certainty that harm will result.4 1 In
addition to the environment, new state-created international law is being
fashioned to address changing facts and new realities, for example, in
intellectual property, trade, human rights, energy, oceans, space and
cyberspace.
State dynamists, however, would continue to insist that new
international political identities to claim international legal personality
must be able to point to some international law treaty, custom, or general
principle of law. The reason for this is that the state remains the sole
seat of representative governance accountable to world populations at the
international level.42 State dynamists argue that formal representative
government should not be cut off at the municipal law pocket by doing
away with the state as the ultimate source of international legal personality. If new international political identities may determine for themselves
whether or not they are international legal personalities this would
precisely be the result.

39. For example, Article 71 of the U.N. Charter adopted in 1945 explicitly authorizes the
Economic and Social Council to provide for the non voting participation of NGO's in Council and

specialized agency deliberations. More recently, Article V (2) of 1994 Marakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization authorizes the General Council to have "effective

cooperation" with NGO's.
40. See the Trial Smelter Arbitration (United States-Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905
(1949), 35 AM. J. IN'L L. 684 (1941) ("[N] o state has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another....")
41. See, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE CHALLENGE OF
IMPLEMENTATION (David Freestone and Ellen Hey eds., 1996); James E. Hickey, Jr. and Vein
Walker, Refining The PrecautionaryPrinciple In InternationalEnvironmental Law, 14 VIRGINIA
ENVIRONMENTAL L. J. 423 (1995).
42. New international political identities, for the most part, do not act in a representative
capacity for populations but rather represent special interests. For example, multinational
corporations primarily represent shareholders and corporate officers. NGOs primarily represent
donors and staffs.
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IV. CONCLUSION.
The 20th Century has seen the rise and expansion of non state
international legal personalities. International and regional organizations,
specialized agencies of the U.N. and human beings have all had
international legal personality conferred on them directly or indirectly by
states. That conferral has been accomplished mainly through treaties
concluded by states.
In recent decades, a growing number of new international political
identities have emerged as participants in the international political,
social, and economic process. These include nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations and to some extent, subnational
governments. An important question for international law in the 21st
Century is whether these new political identities should have international
legal personality (in the sense of having international law rights and
duties including the capacity to directly assert those rights and duties in
international law fora) and if so, from which source? That is, should
these new international political identities be required to look to states for
the source of their international legal personality as other non state
entities have had to do in the past? Or should these new political
identities be able to claim international legal personality in their own
right with, or without, the permission of states? The answers to these
questions will have profound implications for the configuration and
operation of the international law making process in the decades ahead
and the role of the world's populations in that process.
This is a time in history when an increasing number of global issues
are the object of international debate and decision and when states are
becoming more representative and more responsive to their populations
than ever before. That responsive representation ought not to be curtailed
in international law by marginalizing the state's role in determining
international legal personality. If states continue to demonstrate an ability
to respond adequately to the international needs of their populations, it
is perhaps advisable not to adopt an approach to the source of international legal personality that stifles representative government's role at the
international law level.

